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On Paul Goodman?and Goodmanism 
Leo Raditsa 
One does not live forever?maybe that was something Goodman did not under 
stand. When he spoke of death, it was purely statistically, in a manner that 
nonplussed me, as if, when it came to nature, he considered himself merely 
another number: death would seize him at the average age, sixty-five or sixty 
seven. Yet in some distorted fashion statistics represent an acknowledgment of 
nature. In the late fifties, steaming at the neglect of his work, he said, holding 
out his hands in a gesture of futility?which wished to appear simply helpless? 
so that they appeared suddenly twisted about themselves: "How much longer 
have I got to live? Ten, fifteen years." There would not be much more time 
now, almost as if looking at his watch. In this he hit the mark almost to the year. 
For me too his disappearance amounted to a statistic, I noted almost with 
relief. For he added greatly to the confusion and I knew his influence in the 
political sphere to be largely destructive, especially since he feared the conse 
quences of his ideas and the responsibility they entailed?and moreover asked 
questions and stirred up problems he had no intention of dealing with. 
My real desire here, other than to attempt a farewell to a man whom I did 
not like because too plainly destructive, but from whom I learned something 
important, is to consider him as an artist. For although I am not sure he deserves 
the laurel crown, his work is good enough to make a serious judgment in that 
regard necessary?no small accomplishment in these times and in this country. 
With his loyal friend Meyer Liben, another artist who has not yet received 
the recognition he deserves, Goodman invented a prose style. Its chief character 
istic is its 
sharp?and classical?distinction between word and action, and, as a 
consequence, the extremely minor role unacknowledged phantasy, brooding 
and thought plays in it. (Since, Jean-Luc Godard and Gunter Grass have also 
succeeded in calling phantasy by its proper name and thus fashioning something 
approaching myth?but their reference to works of the past is much more hap 
hazard than Goodman's and therefore without his telling scope.) 
In part Goodman achieves this by taking thought (mostly in distinction to 
phantasy) literally?that is, seriously, not merely as somebody's opinion. For in 
stance, in The Grand Piano, the first volume of The Empire City, Goodman 
actually describes a world functioning in Marxist terms. In the later volumes, 
especially in the State of Nature, he does something similar with psychoanalytic 
insights, translating them back into the reality from which they arose. They do 
not entirely fit. In fact, part of the tension of the work arises as one senses this 
lack of fit. Although in the later volumes of The Empire City, in contrast to The 
Grand Piano where the Marxist framework pretends to coincide with the world 
entirely, Goodman acknowledges this discrepancy between thought in the world 
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and the world which is bigger than it, he manages only intermittently and partly 
to face it. For his thoughts appearing in the world like the gods in Homer 
served always in part to protect him from it by pretending they were the world. 
In some sense similar to the specificity of the painters of the Lowlands, this 
not-at-all-pedantic literalness represents a respect for actual thought (an ability 
to distinguish it from brooding, propaganda and phantasy) and for reality?and 
for the relation and the place of thought in reality. Goodman never imagined, 
as novelists now often appear to, that the world occurs in a person's head, and 
that in consequence a novelist's job is to persuade the world that what occurred 
in his head has actually occurred in the world, or could?an attitude that by con 
fusing thought and reality, denies both. (For an important discussion of the 
significance of similar distinctions in the history of the West, see Arthur Collins, 
"The Objects of Perceptual Consciousness in Philosophical Thought," Social Re 
search 40, 1 [1973], 153-176.) Goodman could tell the difference between living 
thought and mere obsession and thus knew that what occurred in him was a 
part of nature and could be found in the world. All the more remarkably?since 
there appeared to be no subject his tongue respected in silence?he never spoke 
about it, merely acted upon it as an artist. 
As a result of this capacity to grasp the proper place of things, no one pre 
dominates in unacknowledged narcissism in his fiction. This means his works 
can be read, in fact often ask to be read, aloud in company. No implicit demand 
here that his work be read in the darkness of silence where thoughts, phantasies 
and the taste of the world are barely distinguishable from each other. He does 
not, as many contemporary writers do, invite the complicity of his reader, partly 
because, I think, he sees always they are more than 
one: his works are social 
and know in their very movement?this is their grace?that their life presupposes 
at least the survival of society, if not its life, and of language, its breath. 
In this they contrast with much contemporary scribbling ("good spelling" 
Goodman used to call it) which with preposterous vanity assumes it came before 
society and even before creation. No wonder it is often so dim and unintelligible! 
And although it often fancies it exalts the individual, putting him as it were 
before the constitution, it actually fears for his life, for it cannot conceive of him 
living in the face of his fellows. 
In Goodman's prose narrative (it is not "fiction") what people do is more im 
portant than what they think about what they do. In part as a result of this, their 
actions have some relation to what they think, and are, therefore, intelligible, 
in fact, too intelligible. For Goodman had little sense of what he did not under 
stand: his hand was always up with the answer. That is why perhaps his worlds 
were finally little. 
In this factuality, in this unassuming insistence on reality, Goodman's work 
mirrors in some way the American pragmatic bent. Not for nothing did he choose 
as hero Horatio Alger?and how he used to talk about him: you could hear the 
history of the country, certainly the city, in his voice and his love of it! At its 
best, at its deepest, The Empire City desires to answer, or at least understand, 
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the question of who Americans are now. Goodman did not consider the in 
heritance of the Constitution in its exercise from generation to generation some 
thing that could be taken for granted. 
In contrast, Goodman's insistence on the place of reason and delight (a delight 
sometimes a trifle programmatic) in reality and, therefore, nature does not cor 
respond to recent American experience, although it would not have been out of 
place in the eighteenth century. For pragmatism when not outright mind-destroy 
ing can be mind-denying. Sometimes it clings to the facts, because it will not 
understand them. As if it knew that the way to lie is to dare one to see what is 
going on before his eyes. It fears unwitting thought?lest it stir up memories of 
unfulfilled love and the sweetness of desire. In plain grimness it leaves out "the 
human factor" as the "social engineers" put it?and allows one to think without 
being aware of it, with the result that a man lives neither on heaven nor earth 
?and fears values. 
Goodman's confidence in the place of reason, of words?for he tended to con 
sider thought, in the contemporary use of the word, mere inhibited speech?to 
the extent that it was learned drew support from Aristotle?the Aristotle of the 
University of Chicago in the days of its splendor where, it is my impression, 
Goodman lived happy and crucial years for the development of the understanding 
and the consciousness of reason and its relation to nature which is at the heart 
of his style in his work as an artist. The departure from Chicago and with it 
from the academic world must not have been easy, especially when one realizes 
that in several crucial respects Goodman was one of the truest academics in 
America: he spoke of it rarely. 
Aristotle supported Goodman's own sense of the palpability of nature, of the 
world of men and thought. For Aristotle, he once remarked to me, thinking was 
like eating?by which he did not mean that thinking took the place of eating, 
but that the apprehension of the world in thought and perception nourished 
his growth and his delight as much as food and in as necessary a fashion. Good 
man's delight is not as deep as Aristotle's, nor as sure of itself. At times it is more 
wished-for than self-evident and its outlines are not so clear. For there is often 
more than a touch of vengeance or hate in Goodman's reason. But there is the 
same basic confidence in the existence of the universe and pleasure in it as in 
Aristotle and the same accurate, neither brash nor over-modest experience of 
the self. With this difference, however, that Goodman assumed the universe 
only as an artist?indeed railed against it as a man, as if it would not give him 
ground enough to stand on. 
Such confidence has place for tragedy, for it must know that actions have 
consequences. In Goodman's work this space, clearly marked?for its shape was 
overwhelming?was, for the most part, left empty, with a kind of grace which 
he fiercely denied in his "personal" life, for those to move in who could and 
dared. His art touches upon tragic subjects but does not have the strength of 
heart to face them full in the face, except in plays like Abraham and Isaac and 
The Cave at Macapelah and stories like Bathers at Westover Pond and perhaps 
The Life of Richard Savage where it stops just short enough of nobility to allow 
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the reader to make the leap on his own, if he will. It is comic because it cannot 
be entirely tragic. Because it cannot weep but only speak about weeping, it 
laughs, more often smiles, at times condescendingly. 
But this leaves one uneasy, oppressed, for the subject matter, once raised, is 
too serious to be brushed aside with laughter. In this, in its inability to experi 
ence its tragedy and in its inability to dismiss it, it is an art unwittingly con 
gruent to its times. 
Its importance lies in its assumption of the importance of facts, in its clear 
distinction between what can be denied and what cannot. That is why Good 
man's characters do not chatter. In fact, at the times they do speak, they often 
sing. As a result of this respect for what actually occurs, Goodman's art points to 
the present's continuity with the past?how else could Goodman have written a 
play about Abraham and Isaac?as well as to its break with it. This means it 
will occasion something approaching dread when it does not evade it in the 
laughter of those who fear to weep. 
In its distinction between thought and actuality and in its knowledge of their 
relation it points to the place of man in nature. For only when thought is made 
to substitute for nature can one entertain the illusion it is coterminous with it 
?and that man is a master of it and in consequence his own slave. 
But the place of nature in Goodman's art, though distinct, is in the distance, 
as in Flemish painting, to be seen from a window, from the inside. I am think 
ing of the beautiful description of the ocean (worthy of Homer) in The Empire 
City and of the setting of Bathers at Westover Pond. Nature in his work does 
not move or grow as his men and women do not move or grow but wait for the 
reader to give them life. In fact it is men's distance from nature one feels in his 
work?and their restlessness at it?as if the plants were objects behind a window 
pane. 
This too is a tragic theme, not tragically realized, with the result that the 
distance holds and one does not suffer the terror of its overcoming (something 
Goodman consequently, and characteristically, thought was much easier to do 
than it actually is?as if it were only the stupidity of others which kept us from 
it). One does not move to touch what one beholds?although one knows, vividly, 
it could be touched. But one cannot move. Maybe Goodman dares one to move 
but not entirely in good faith, for he does not countenance the consequences 
of his challenge. In full tragedy instead you would hear the plants grow as in 
the Oedipus Rex and Oedipus at Colonus, and know what it costs to hear them. 
In a sense this remoteness from what he will nevertheless know is there grows 
most tangible when one contrasts it with Goodman's beautiful descriptions of 
works of art, for instance, the account of a performance of Die Meistersinger 
von N?rnberg. Here there is no distance, but sweet intimacy. He allowed himself 
an ease and closeness in experiencing art which he did not touch in living. 
In Goodman's art there are clear beginnings. For he does not have to discover 
what he is about as he goes along but seems to have known it all along (if any 
thing, he is too sure of what he is doing)?and so his endings are authentic. That 
is, they allow one to turn with renewed appetite to another work?or to life 
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itself; they do not keep one returning to what has not been concluded because 
not really begun. In his art there is always space for something?for other trouble 
and other pleasure and above all for the world, more lucid and distinct to the 
touch, always after art 
as after rain. I think of Breughel?without the assurance 
in the living god and, therefore, with more caution and more recklessness and 
more dread. 
In contrast, the notorious inability of contemporary art to bring things to fitting 
conclusion, to a conclusion one can apprehend in the joy of veracity, is actually 
a difficulty in really beginning. It is only at the last word?which makes for no 
end?that the poet discovers he has not really begun at all. 
His art does not pretend to do the living for you. Nobody flatters the reader 
less or shows his intelligence, his ability to see and hear, more respect. In this I 
think he was truly aristocratic: he knew men to have been intelligent before 
they grew stupid, free before they grew servile, freespoken before they guaran 
teed the abuse of their right of free speech. 
This means, of course, also that he set standards for his readers. He hardly 
thought of entertaining them or of educating them; he assumed they were edu 
cated and, therefore, had learned that pleasure springs from activity. Any reader 
of his work has to put a good deal into it; it is sparse and does not attempt to 
do what it cannot. As a result one feels one has a part in fashioning it as one 
reads?but in a very different way, almost opposite to the current fashions of 
"audience participation" which have led to a confusion of art with life, and 
inevitably the debasement of both, as if one could live works of art, and art 
could be made to substitute for life. 
In his art he followed the old wisdom of freedom: to set an example others 
might follow. Here he did not tell others what to do: how to teach when he did 
not teach; how to heal when he did not heal; how to love when he did not love; 
how to get angry when he rarely fell into a rage except at absolutes which do 
not exist. Quietly, he imitated the masters. 
In consequence of its live relation to the work of the past, his art, even in its 
failures, could show the path out of the present preconceptions in "art" which 
make it hard, for me at any rate, to believe the words in the novels and poetry 
I read. I mean the sense that art and knowledge are somehow at odds?and that, 
therefore, one can believe neither. For Goodman knew the slow ascent to the 
heights or, at least, the foothills from which the great works of the past (works 
which do not draw such antitheses between art and knowledge) can be imitated 
rather than adored?if, as he once put it, the Americans would ever dare learn to 
read. 
He knew, I think?although perhaps he would have objected to putting it this 
way?that the Western tradition belonged not to those who wrote about it in 
the manner of tourists on the packaged tour from the outside looking in; it be 
longed to those who dared imitate it. This attitude meant you did not have to 
discover everything yourself ("research")?that had been God's work, and it 
had been well done. 
The point was rather to let what had been done teach one?to dare to look 
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at what lay to hand. He defined his own work in terms of the work of his pre 
decessors (whom, incidentally, he did not hope to equal). That is why he simply 
did not give a hang about fashion. From him you could learn the relation of 
independence to knowledge. 
As far as I know he was not self-conscious or even conscious about the origi 
nality of his art, although certainly aware of its merits. The measure of these 
merits he took with a soberness not to be found in his evaluation of his own 
social criticism or, generally, in his thirst for glory. This is because the "novelty" 
of his work, its strangeness, lay precisely in its traditional character. Also, he was 
at heart probably modest about what he really did well. 
But this style he took so for granted never ceased to set me to wonder?and 
to provoke cries of illiteracy from editors more cocksure than literate. "When 
they think it's wordy," he told me once of editors, "it's an unmistakable sign they 
don't know what you're talking about." Certainly, the difficulties he suffered in 
getting his art published occurred because, when editors and publishers did not 
understand his work, they would not admit they did not understand (such was 
their ignorance) but preferred instead to take their astonishment for Goodman's 
ignorance. He wrote like nobody else they had ever read, therefore he must be 
illiterate. 
In the two years or so I spent trying to get The Empire City published, it was 
hardest simply to get editors to sit down and read the book; they would not do 
it. In the rare instances when they did, they would often simply answer that the 
man 
obviously could not write. 
The real problem was that publishers are interested in writers, but Goodman 
was an author, a minor author but an author. This meant he set standards, and 
knew his work to be fresh from his own hands?all of which unnerved editors, 
for it showed them their place. He was not to be their creature. He did not 
attempt to hide it. 
In his dealings with the writing of his contemporaries, he was quick to ferret 
out whatever was of merit and accord it its due?something he did not readily 
do to living people. His criticism of unpublished work was generous and con 
structive; he did not make excessive demands and was ready with his support? 
a 
very rare quality. His artistic view was so broad and deep?and built on real 
intimacy with a small number of masterpieces he could call to mind at will?that 
he was quick to sense the limitations and parochialness of much that was pub 
lished. Here too he was hard, cold, given to an infuriating arrogance, biting hard 
on his pipe with an assumed look of wisdom?which served often to veil his here 
and now. But the basic 
experience was real; he cared about letters. He was a 
much better citizen in that Republic than in the one in which he was native born. 
He had known a living sweetness once?that is what one has to learn from his 
art. He had been in the Garden of Eden. You can tell it perhaps most in his 
evocations of childhood, which he treated like a prehistoric age. Buried under 
the superficial coldness, the experience of primordial delight stirs in his stories, 
novels, poems, plays. There 
was an 
unearthly innocence about it all?and it was 
frightening, for it promised to give no quarter. As a person a great deal of his 
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agony and some of his ferocity seemed to spring from a knowledge of the exis 
tence of that world and an inability to touch it in life?although in his art he 
moved in it with a certain sureness and a softness, like Adam naming the animals. 
But alas, he was rarely fierce, most often simply desirous of ferocity or crudely 
cruel, just as he was more often insulting than frank. 
Lucky is he who has let the sweet and, on occasion, harsh taste of reality 
dispel his youthful phantasies?rather than give in to them. But Goodman insisted 
on fidelity to them. In their name he would, it seemed, betray almost anything 
else. As a result in his company sometimes difficult but possible actions, like 
leaving home, appeared beyond aspiration's compass. It was not easy to hope in 
his presence?one felt oneself incurably naive if one did. There was a dead note 
of cynicism at the heart of his apparent confidence in the accessibility of a better 
world which winced and dreaded, most of all, the simple movements of freedom 
it pretended so much to herald. 
I do not like his New York in The Empire City. But it is a city as opposed to 
a dormitory, a place in which people have some relationship to each other be 
sides mere economic exchange, where they experience their lack of relation to 
each other?which makes for its harrowing emptiness. At least it knows it is 
empty. In his city there is little real work, pleasure, education?and citizenship 
amounts to kidding around, although it yearns for seriousness. 
His work raises the most fundamental of political questions: how do you 
fashion art in an "urban environment" in which citizenship is difficult of exercise, 
which is administered rather than governed (and whose politics is, therefore, 
incomprehensible), where the constant storm of strangers tends to make friend 
ship and intimacy appear odd and exotic, where a man hardly knows how to 
greet another. In fact by attempting to fashion art (instead of merely pretending 
to) in such a world, he uncovers whatever there is of a city?that is precious 
little, and often the part of the city one would like to forget or ignore. 
Goodman was asking what Horatio Alger would be like now?an authentic 
historical question. His answer was not reassuring?Horatio 
was on the fringes 
and the 
upward way was not as clear 
as it once was. He was poor, because he 
could no longer feel enthusiasm for exchange or perceive its rationality. The 
poverty Goodman describes is of a country that does not know how to be rich; 
it has little to do with need?in fact it conceives of itself in terms of need only 
because it fears to know itself for what it is. It is the poverty of people always 
in a hurry. It is a poverty that has little to do with lack of money?but with the 
lack of relation of money to value. That is why his people are unsettling; they 
do not let you forget this inability to experience value, to live at the heart of the 
city. They would be better forgotten?except that they have been written. 
Had our politicians read The Empire City (that that is inconceivable points 
to what is wrong), they would have known an urban crisis was upon them 
before The New York Times announced it as reflected in the latest MIT studies. 
But that would have meant trusting an artist and, more importantly, one's 
own 
eyes. 
It is a startling artistic assertion to be brought up face to face with the fact 
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that one lives in New York, for it amounts to experiencing that one has no sense 
of measure or proportion?and has attempted to exult in it. That is why, inciden 
tally, it is extremely difficult to make art out of New York?art as distinguished 
from confession and political propaganda masking as art. For it means lending 
proportion and perspective to something without it?and that with hardly any 
tutelary deities to address! Such measure cannot be discovered without turning 
New York inside out, upside down, as Goodman did disconcertingly?but for 
solely artistic reasons, for reasons of sight?in order to see what he was looking at. 
Simply, Goodman called attention to the way it feels to walk down a New York 
Street?and not only to the way it feels but to the way it actually is. He told me 
of a piece of fiction I was working on, "You describe the way you think it is, not 
the way it actually is. Go out and look. Do they look the way you say they do, 
the bums in Madison Square Park?" 
But if Goodman could solve these problems in his art, he had litde sense of 
how to solve them or even encounter them in life?although he claimed the 
contrary, loudly. He lost his head to his magic. It was as if he assumed he could 
act in the world in the same way he fashioned works of art. When he tried it, 
as he kept on trying it, he suffered rude blows of disappointment. Even in his 
art he did not so much resolve these problems as refuse stoutly to obscure them 
by attempting artistically what they made it impossible to do without sham. 
As an artist he knew these limits and loved them, for he realized they had 
relation to the shapes of things and therefore allowed him the freedom he desired 
and was capable of. But in politics it was another matter. Here he savaged all 
limits, as if they constrained him "personally" even when he did not know of 
their existence. In his social and political writings?in contrast to his art?he went 
with deceptive?and to some of the young, seductive?ease way beyond his depth. 
Here seemingly there were no problems one could not lightly attack and resolve. 
The price for that spurious confidence came higher than I think he realized: 
distance from the searing tragedy of the times?a distance nearly endemic to 
them (for how else could international communism have survived?), but in the 
instance of Goodman treated as almost desirable. 
But on another level, not on the level at which he spoke but rather at the 
level at which he simply breathed, in the words which broke from him of their 
own, in the things he did not say but acknowledged with a sign, he was deeply 
serious?so much so that I feel his writings on politics amounted to an effort to 
deny what he really knew but would not suffer knowing. Almost as an aside 
once, referring to the division of the West between the United States and free 
Europe and the Soviet Union, he said, "It's done too much damage to all of us 
already." He uttered it softly, as if he would not hear himself?and turned im 
mediately to another subject, as if he would forget. Or once, with an emphasis 
I rarely heard from him?"The Soviet Union can't stand psychoanalysis, because 
it's the truth." 
His anxious insistence on persuading others of his political views probably 
arose from his own sense that he was denying something he knew. Strangely, 
in the name of telling it all, he appealed, I suspect, to individuals who sensed 
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they dared not acknowledge something they knew. That could be practically 
everybody. 
He appealed to the desire in perhaps almost everyone to say out what is on 
his mind and heart?but especially to those who had been silent in their youth 
and regretted it?and would take an impotent vengeance on it by espousing doc 
trinaire radicalism, mysticism, etc., and who would thus, incidentally, deprive 
themselves of the first fruits of their maturity?a maturity they took for granted 
in a 
way that never ceases to amaze me; no wonder our poetry is so tame when 
it does not gripe or bitch?and joy stirs so unwillingly in it. 
I knew him when I was at Harvard and in the years when I was fresh out, a 
hard time in which ideals and illusions had to be shed, or, at least, put aside, in 
order to see what was really there or would be there in their absence?to see if 
they would spring up of their own in life when not expected. The risk had to be 
taken that there would be nothing inside which would come to life of its own, 
that the ideals were mere shields 
against an inner emptiness and an inner desert 
in which nothing would stir, and against entering the world in all its beauty, a 
world I sensed would (and could but) drive home in stinging, even burning 
recognition whatever incapacity for life there was in me. 
I was trapped in my ideals?in a society which has superstitious regard for 
them, especially in the young, whom it fears to address critically, to get angry 
with and finally to love, whom it enshrines in glass cages?in the absence of 
saints. 
I needed someone to tell me firmly, with some confidence in the ebb and 
flow of life, to drop my ideals, that is, to stop using them as a way of keeping 
things and myself at a distance. Otherwise I might resort to desecration in 
desperation. For that was the closest I could get to telling myself to drop them. 
Goodman appealed to me, because I hoped he would help me free myself 
from some of these illusions I could not distinguish from ideals and at the same 
time strengthen me to act on my own in the spirit of the ideals. But he broke 
the illusions 
only to substitute his own ideals for them, 
more intractable and 
more destructive and just as much illusion as those they replaced. 
He used to call me Kid, to my enduring resentment. But now as I remember, 
I realize, he taunted me with this address, because he could not bring my age 
home to me simply in his presence. In retrospect the situation is comic; I was 
eighteen or nineteen and editor of a magazine I had founded, and one of the 
few people at that time who would publish him. For him to have made me 
feel my age without subjecting me to his contempt would have entailed assuming 
the responsibilities of a man and an adult, something in my judgment he was 
always ambiguous about?and that is putting it mildly. 
Besides my yearning for sensible advice, his evident education and his security 
in it drew me to him; he made intelligible statements. I never had a teacher at 
Harvard?with the 
exception of John Conway, who, I felt, was educated?who 
could point confidently to the nature of things, and it had driven me to a kind of 
despair. Goodman contrasted to all this. He breathed a kind of intellectual con 
fidence?like a man who could take the view from the mountains?that would 
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not be brushed aside. In part it was a confidence assumed like a fine suit?but 
that was only because he could not approach his genius with entire directness 
and trust to it; he always mediated between it and himself. He did not confuse 
critical questioning with neurotic doubting?in contrast to many of my professors 
who encouraged me to doubt, because they did not believe what they said? 
which is not to doubt at all. 
The fact of the matter?and I stress it because it throws plain light on the 
present ruin and dishonesty of the universities?is that it was extremely difficult 
to learn solid and significant facts at Harvard, as opposed to unintelligible in 
formation, of which there was plenty. No one dared affirm them, because it 
would have meant taking responsibility for distinguishing between the im 
portant and the trivial and more importantly giving the past its own due?and, 
therefore, acquiring some sense of the shape of the present, of its limitations. 
For the limitless 
aspirations of the present?for instance, for eternal peace?and 
also incidentally its limitless fears?for instance, for the destruction of the planet 
?point out its own inability to know itself, to distinguish between definitions 
and restrictions. 
The kind of facts I mean are: how many republics were there in Europe in the 
nineteenth century? When did full suffrage come in the democracies of the 
West? What were the arguments against it? How many people did Stalin kill in 
his purges? How did one get to speak in the Athenian Assembly? What office 
did Pericles hold? How did you become a Roman senator? 
With a strange variation on the prudery of the Victorians, which strikes us 
as so inapt, it was assumed one knew these things already "from high school" 
(I'd like to hear about that high school), and it would, therefore, be graceless, 
even impolite to question students about them. As 
a result, one rarely came face 
to face with one's ignorance?a harsh but in the end strengthening experience 
without which, in any case, any real learning is impossible. Instead of the basics, 
one learned the latest, new-fangled theories which, often, made contempt for 
predecessors substitute for conviction. When one should have been treated like 
a kid one was treated like an adult in fawning elaboration?and when one should 
have been treated like an adult, one suddenly realized, one was not taken ser 
iously at all. Too soft to be hard and too hard to be soft, such attitudes could 
but incite general exasperation, apathy, and violence?as they have. For they 
made it impossible to conceive of growth?let alone to feel it. 
To all this Goodman provided refreshing contrast. It never occurred to him 
to doubt the elementary facts he had learned in all areas of knowledge?and he 
would present them casually in conversation with a lucidity of understanding, 
let one perceive the pangs of one's ignorance?and in them, one's appetite for 
knowledge. And he would not truck with insults to the old masters, although 
he would on occasion indulge in something approaching them himself, as when 
once he remarked (on reading the Inferno), it's all gripes, all, all gripes. (To 
which I should have answered one did not suffer exile and die in it for the sake 
of griping.) When I remarked arrogantly that the Aeneid was boring because it 
lacked genuine feeling, he countered swiftly and with a decisiveness at which 
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I smarted: "Don't you see how sad he is, how very sad he is." You could feel 
Vergil's presence starting in the room. 
He knew better than most professors what a dissertation is, explication of a 
classic text?in which mastery is called for, not brilliance or originality. A mas 
tery whose modesty?for it implies respect for the past?stirs shame in many 
students who have been encouraged from childhood to be Titans lest they dis 
cover they are sons of Adam. For it requires actual courage rather than swash 
buckling and occasions actual pride rather than blustering vanity. 
He taught because he learned?rather than learned because he had to teach. 
As a result one had in his presence an almost unearthly sense of the accessibility 
of great works which were as much a part of his daily life as food and drink. 
He did not study them?but he let them teach him. He set me to reading many 
wonderful things: Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, Tasso, Egmont, The Elective Af 
finities, Franz Boas' The Mind of Primitive Man, Kropotkin's Memoirs?and he 
would hit the ceiling in something faintly but distinctly reminiscent of a noble 
rage when he ran into a "political scientist" who did not know Aristotle's Politics. 
It was the works which made you serious. I think he believed it was the 
company of great works which ennobled. In any case he struck me as noble most 
of all when he spoke of them?and defended them from the foolishly irreverent 
?or reverent. 
When he spoke of his student days and especially of his teachers (to whom 
his important work The Structure of Literature is dedicated with words that tell 
more of education than many books), a warmth and a firmness flowed in his 
voice which I rarely heard otherwise, as if this were one time of his life he had 
known to its depth. You could actually feel the presence of the classroom and 
his teachers' voices as he remembered. The respect he held for his teachers 
seemed to be the closest he reached to an absolute in his living; I never heard him 
question it?although at the same time he ferociously criticized the educational 
system. He felt this respect, I think, because he had not hesitated to disagree 
with them and to question them until he was satisfied. In contrast we?or, at 
least, I?although encouraged, until our ears split, to criticize, had in my experi 
ence 
rarely raised our hands to question?and then never on fundamentals. He 
called that in me, too: "You kids are afraid to be wrong. We, we were always 
up with our hands. Many was the time, when on the Seventh Avenue subway 
on the way down from the City, I had to admit to myself, I had been wrong 
in the argument"?on his face the memory of his acknowledgment as if he had 
been reexperiencing it?"but you kids never take a chance." He was right about 
that. 
Even about painting and sculpture, arts with which in my impression he held 
little relation?besides poetry, drama, and narrative, he appeared closest to music: 
I came upon him once composing?he taught me something, when he pointed 
out that Mark Rothko's pictures were not really to be looked at but made people 
look better against them and repeated Jackson Pollock's comment about desiring 
people to come into the pasture with him. It is true that those pictures tend to 
lead one's eyes to the people in the room and clear one's vision of them. And it 
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helps to explain how it is that the Museum of Modern Art with its cafeterias 
and movie theatre, with its rooms rambling on forever as in a deserted mansion, 
is perhaps our closest approximation to 
a 
city square, windowless and blister 
ingly lit. 
As I write it feels almost sweet?a tone which surprises me?for in reality 
Goodman was harsh, unseemly, cold and swelling with resentment?and most 
of the time spoiling for a fight. When he dropped his coldness (something which 
occurred among strangers who were not on to the vassal relationship he de 
manded of those who surrounded him?and which in that peculiar parochialness 
of Manhattan he never dreamt of reciprocating like a lord, for he would deprive 
even obedience of its pleasures) he simply smarted or burned?with an antagon 
ism you could feel pierce the air. Had he been freer, the same warmth would 
have (rather than burned in confinement) radiated from him in soft enthusiasm 
which will bend but not break. 
Simply, Goodman was not as much interested in helping as he pretended. In 
fact, his advice acted upon led to the very opposite of what he pretended. This 
is why he appealed to many kids, especially to kids not able to cope with the 
contempt flushed on them on all sides by teachers and adults whose lack of 
self-respect the untoward moves of youth could not help bringing to the surface 
for all to see. By ostensibly taking their side, he entangled them even more 
deeply in the web they sought to free themselves from. For the young's "radical" 
(so sad such a beautiful word should be made to serve such extortionary ends) 
demand that the world be made over before they please to enter it is also in 
part a concealed confession of fear of entering it, of leaving home. And although 
it speaks exclusively of the world's pains (its injustice), it fears its pleasure also 
?and its justice?that is, its freedom. By encouraging their righteousness and thus 
confirming their paralysis, Goodman often kept the young from taking the first 
step which would lead to the next and make it possible for them to discern the 
relation of action to desire. That is why he feared value and spoke compulsively 
of lust. For he would not stand their moving on their own; I saw him stricken 
by the simple firm "no" he so often "pointed out" people were incapable of. 
The young went to him as to some wizard for weapons which would work 
against the adults without involving them personally (such a word! as if a man 
did not live or breathe except on express acknowledgment)?and they neglected 
the weapons which were theirs by inheritance but could only be inherited in the 
exercise: their hearts and minds, the words which rose of themselves to their 
lips but which they would not hear except from others. 
We did fear error, above all?about that you were right, Paul. 
And the magic worked wonders. At the spells the greatest educational in 
stitutions in the country tumbled down in a ruin, as if to say they had never 
stood at all?and only a fool would have dared think so. As if the way to keep 
privilege without shouldering its responsiblities in an egalitarian-minded society 
was to admit one did not deserve what one had. It needed no siege weapons, no 
trumpets, not even a sentence, a full declarative sentence as solid and as soft as 
a landscape, but just a word, "confront," which might sound like a command or a 
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hortatory injunction?which is what you do when you wish to look someone in 
the face and speak your mind (not what you think is your mind or what you 
feel you should think) but cannot. And no one grew surprised. For this too was 
to be expected. Had we not all imagined it at one time or another? And who 
would dare distinguish his dreams from reality? 
The trouble was that the spells worked. At their beckoning notorious school 
marms suddenly "confessed": "We want to know what we have been doing 
wrong." To have said "I" would have implied individual responsibility which 
was precisely what this kind of professor and the students "confronting" him 
both were bent on avoiding. Even when ostensibly opposed they colluded for a 
greater mendacity. 
But these spells with all their wonders are not necessarily the truth. For 
unspoken thoughts often deserve to be denied, even though they cannot be dis 
missed. In any case the wonders of magic can wreak only destruction, for they 
enthrall not only those on whom the spells are cast but their casters as well. 
Here, Paul, you were a pied piper?the pied piper all our school teachers had 
given us careful, detailed warnings against. How did they know so much about 
him? Had they also followed some magician repeating marvelous formulas into 
a dead end? But it did not work?we did not recognize you when you came. 
I think when Goodman complained of lack of recognition, he meant also he 
desired his bluff to be called. For any genuine recognition would distinguish the 
good from the bad?and, thus, encourage the good. In terrible irony, however, 
it was the good in him, his work 
as an artist?not a great artist but a real artist, 
who really knew the liberty of creation, because he knew its limits?which re 
ceived the least recognition. There are not many such artists around?and I thank 
God for them, for I never leave the presence of their work without tasting the 
sweetness of freedom and the palpability of nature and reason. 
In his social and political work Goodman appealed to the yearning for change 
?and yet the unacknowledged ambivalence about it?and perhaps, even more 
deeply, to the inability or, at least, the insecurity in distinguishing it from mere 
evasion. He had a horror of those who believed or sought to believe in his own 
ideas and shook them off with a prudishness?as if in his eyes to take him seri 
ously were unthinkable, an obscenity so lurid as to be inconceivable?which 
amounted to brutality. At the same time he looked for new converts or disciples. 
I think he wished to substitute them for peers. But that is the way of politicians, 
especially of politicians with contempt for the constitutions and the citizens who 
raise them high?not of teachers. 
This ambivalence about change, probably most damaging because it could not 
experience itself as such, found its most superficial expression in impatience, 
haste and the gratuitous assertion that fundamental change for the better would 
be 
easy?if people were not so stupid 
or intractable. It was all so obvious even a 
fool could do it. But that is not the case and could only be maintained if you 
attempted to persuade yourself that history was of little importance, as Good 
man did. At the heart of this ambivalence lay an inability on Goodman's part 
when it came to social and political matters?for 
as an artist he was in earnest? 
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to mean what he said?and more importantly to know what he was talking about. 
He was simply too assured in addressing himself to matters which, however 
absurd they might appear to a first, abstractly-minded glance, had their com 
plicated reasons?and could not be approached recklessly without danger. For 
instance, war?which, no matter how hateful, cannot be simply abolished at a 
wish without risking total confusion, the obliteration of the distinction between 
war and peace and friend and enemy and the drift consequent upon it which 
can but lead to the catastrophe the yearning for peace wishes most to avoid. 
Nor did Goodman seek to hide his inability to mean what he said. Was there 
anything he sought to hide? But compulsive self-revelation can be a form of 
deception?since it in effect dares others to take one more seriously than one 
does oneself. In the instance of Goodman not many people took up the challenge. 
Perhaps Goodman's fundamental ambiguity about change, his readiness to 
embark on it but not to take responsibility for it, was most evident in his out 
rageous (I use the word advisedly) activity as therapist. In the fifties, without 
any medical training, he started treating patients with the most powerful and 
dangerous techniques available, almost 
as a matter of course. It never seemed 
to occur to him that the most daring therapies would also require the most train 
ing and the most caution?and the best of souls. He seemed to assume the 
hardest to be the easiest?an attitude in which the implicit contempt is so over 
whelming as to grow unnoticeable, if one has anything at all to do with it. In 
this as in almost all his social and political activity?in distinction to his action 
as an artist?he was a "forerunner" of the rampant fads of the sixties, in this 
specific instance of the plague of "primal," "encounter," "touch" therapies. All 
these therapies go back in one way or another to the discoveries of Wilhelm 
Reich?but not in serious fashion. 
Where Reich was cautious, careful and daring, they are light-hearted, 
con 
temptuous of patients, sloppy, impatient, reckless. Where Reich knew there could 
be no feeling without content (without its proper object and occasion), they 
seek to separate the expression of emotion from feeling?as if they were training 
actors, no, marionettes. As a result, they cannot distinguish one patient from 
another, nor doctors from patients?and they seek to treat the world because 
they cannot heal themselves. This was the kind of freedom Goodman hawked 
when he forsook his art and took to the streets. 
Goodman was, obviously, not as vulgar or as greedy as many of those who 
have come after him. No one who had ever really read anything worth reading 
could be. Although he mistook irreverence for necessary defiance and arrogance 
for courage, he was not greedy; I do not think he hungered for power over oth 
ers. Also, he was too educated, and loved knowledge enough, to really whore on 
television and the rest. But, nevertheless, he was callous and contemptuous. He 
did plenty of damage. 
Why did nobody take him to task openly and publicly for doing work he was 
so 
obviously unqualified for both in character and in training? Why did the 
professionals not speak up? How is it that at present hardly anyone speaks out 
against these wretched "therapies"? It would be an offense to freedom, the 
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saying goes. But this silence speaks more of a hatred of freedom than of a love 
for it, for it encourages its abuse. 
Goodman was stricken by a mild remark of Lionel Trilling's which I repeated 
to him when he consented to the choice of The Empire City as a selection of 
the Readers' Subscription, to the effect that Goodman should stick to his writing 
and stop taking patients. To my knowledge it helped, perhaps decisively per 
suaded him to give up his activity as therapist. For this man who insulted almost 
everybody he met (perhaps because he feared above all to please), and wounded 
many deeply enough so they could not hear his name without pain, was himself 
deeply sensitive to direct criticism. 
But he did not receive it. Instead he was isolated, first by ignorance, then by 
uncritical and self-serving acceptance of his least important work. His offensive 
ness 
represented an attempt to overcome this isolation?to refuse to be shackled 
in it?as it were, at one blow. But it served, sadly, only to provoke it anew. I 
often felt he was clamoring to get out. 
But if Goodman ceased taking patients, he did not stop attacking people he 
met at parties or in public situations in the name of "psychoanalytic" insight and 
truth. In this activity he invoked the shade of Socrates, forgetting Socrates was 
a courageous soldier and respected the law?that he did not fear for his life in 
his truth. 
He would 
"point things out" to people, tell them they obviously did not mean 
what they said, for he could hear the distraction in their voices; ask them why 
they smiled compulsively and sought to please; tell them about their relations to 
their wives. Often there would be an insinuation of unacknowledged homosexual 
tendencies. He once asked a friend of mine in Cambridge (about eighteen or 
nineteen years old), in front of some attractive girls, how many times a week 
he masturbated. 
He looked for sexual troubles with a vengeance. When people were out to 
distract themselves, he would attempt to call them up short. In the name of 
health! For he felt the only way to better the world was to act on what you saw, 
instantly. 
There are some individuals who cannot help doing this. They upset others be 
cause they are bigger than most. With them it is admirable, for one cannot help 
learning from them. But with Goodman it was forced and programmatic; there 
was always a theory behind it?you could practically spell it out. I think if he had 
let himself be, he would have shaken with fear. It is I think what he sensed 
when he once remarked that he was incurably sick?but he hardly meant it. 
It was hateful. But nobody in my experience, including me, ever fought back 
directly. There would be embarrassed terror and weak smiles, a pallor, like pan 
cake mix, stark on their faces, as he would talk on pretending he was a doctor 
making objective observations. Like an archaeologist identifying a just-discovered 
potsherd, he would then proceed with a melancholy, detached gaze to point out 
the person's helplessness, his inability to defend himself. He would turn to his 
disciples hanging around, for an "objective" confirmation of his observation. 
They would invariably agree in a dead cold tone which fancied itself to be the 
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voice of the nature of things. It was really a New York gang beating somebody up. 
People put up with it because they were weak. He attracted people who were 
weak partly because he promised to make them strong?but only made them 
weaker, in just the way gangs destroy individuals?partly because what he said 
always had an unmistakable kernel of truth. 
Wasn't this what freedom was supposed to be? The truth above everything 
else! Hadn't our teachers?for instance, I. A. Richards at Harvard?encouraged 
us to immerse in the destructive element, hinted that there was something genuine 
in Stavrogin, worthy if not of honor, certainly not of neglect? 
" 
T started out with 
the idea of unrestricted freedom and I have arrived at unrestricted despotism.' 
" 
The brutal truth of the matter is that Goodman hated a lot and envied a lot. 
He sought to express this hatred and this envy without experiencing it as his 
own by using the truths of psychoanalysis as a weapon. This is despicable. 
(Needless to say, he thought so too.) When one remembers the prevalence of 
his political ideas, it is harrowing. 
Had he been able to mean what he said he might have died a hero's death 
something he feared, probably, but not enough to relinquish all aspiration to 
it?for he treasured the memory of heroes and knew that they too had lived. You 
cannot say the kind of things he said in earnest without risking your life. And 
there were moments especially in his sprightliness and in his freedom of enter 
prise in art and in his brutal, awkward, mechanical thrusts at the truth?for he 
did sense that the truth lived like the sun and sky and that you could not behold 
one without knowing the other?when I winced at the sparks of greatness starting 
from him. But they quickly went out?as if he would not have them but yet 
would not forget them. 
Something much deeper than the mere yearning to draw attention to his art 
impelled Goodman to turn publicist. He was blinded by a touching hope: he 
desired to bring his art into life. That was his magic: he would let his creations 
loose on life?where, alas, they would not be recognized for what they were, 
where they would cause distress, elation, court disaster?and betray those who 
did not know them for what they were. Even the government would come to 
think like Horatio?and take to the streets to learn the physics of the bouncing 
ball. 
Leaving off the splendid robes of an artist, Goodman put on the mufti of the 
simple citizen. But for him it was a disguise; inside he remained an artist, at a 
remove (it helps to explain his iciness), never entirely in his voice of citizen, 
in some sense indifferent?as if the destiny he shared was not his?like Leonardo 
sketching an execution, there, but neither audience nor actor. This meant he 
would have to deny what he ostensibly said?and turn on his disciples (before, 
incidentally, they turned on him, which is what would have happened had he 
been the teacher he sometimes fancied himself). 
By attempting to draw apart the transparent veil which distinguished, but 
which perhaps appeared to him merely to separate, his art from living, and to 
lead his creatures into creation?as if they too must be driven from the garden, 
if only to encourage the stirring within us which would lead us back to it? 
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Goodman attempted to face up to the implications of Thomas Mann's tendency 
to see the inability to live and the fear of life as close to the core of art. Mann 
posed the question: If the real task was living, what was then the place of art 
which appeared to know sweetness only at the price of not experiencing it here 
and now? If art were to survive and, for that matter, we were to live rather 
than merely exist, works which grasped the relation of art to life in different 
fashion than Mann would have to answer this question. Goodman made such 
works. 
Most profound in Goodman's conception (which also had its trivial and ridicu 
lous aspects) was his sure sense that art was a part of life, like a man rejoicing 
at the dawn, not opposed to it or a compensation for it. This sense enabled him 
to move with sprightliness and liberty and courage in his creation; one never 
knew what he would do next in his work. It also led him fatally to confuse life 
with art, to take life for art. 
Had he had the critics he deserved he might have been spared the pitfalls of 
his success. He might also have had an audience. It is true he had numerous 
readers?but he never had, it is my impression, an audience that knew itself as 
such. For that is impossible without real critics?not 
men who read novels some 
what in the way of politically interested divines, to catch errors and distortions 
in secular theology, of which there 
are 
many, all too many?but critics who can 
distinguish between art and propaganda, both psychological and political?and 
who are big-hearted enough to risk error in good faith in naming the beautiful 
and the ugly. 
That is perhaps the hardest test?precisely because it is no test at all?for an 
artist to function without an audience, that is, without serious criticism. Picasso 
lived with it by presenting non-works to his non-audience?and flattered them by 
not reminding them of what they had lost: better life in the ruins without 
Piranesi to show they could not be looked at without remembering. Besides, the 
loss of proportion could be ignored as long as it was clamorously asserted to be 
a form of ugliness which might pass for beauty. Who could in any case tell the 
difference? Goodman instead attempted to create, and when he saw he could 
not, to invent, an audience. 
It led him?and I do not exaggerate?to attempt to refashion the world in 
order to find place for his art in it. That was at the heart of his grasp of the 
importance of community, of a society in which individuals could tangibly grasp 
their relation to each other. Without it the experience of art was impossible. 
As I have already hinted, he knew his own time better than he let on. In a 
sense his outcries represented an attempt to deny this knowledge, pressing in 
upon him?as well as out upon him, as it were, from the inside. He knew he 
wrote in a bad period for art. He spoke of it, rarely, in a soft, matter-of-fact, 
almost casual tone that did not belie the quiet note of authentic suffering in his 
voice, almost lyrical, full of regret and burgeoning tears. This was probably his 
real voice?what he would have heard had he been able to listen to himself more 
than intermittently?strangely soft, fluid and firm. Had he spoken it always, he 
would have only sung. The righteous whining, the self-pity made up an outcry 
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against it, for he would not suffer himself entirely to live. When he spoke in it, 
I did not think to doubt him?or to impugn his motives. 
He lived in the troughs of two world wars which with all their inebriated cries 
of the coming of a new age had to make do with a life among ruins, ruins whose 
overseeing presence grows palpable when one attempts to do a piece of work 
that does not attempt to define itself as something new, that is, as something 
justified by catastrophe. 
This is, I think, his legacy: he kept up some connection with what had gone 
before and, therefore, with the liberty of creation, man's and, therefore, also 
God's. 
In this he stands with W. H. Auden and Thornton Wilder, whose work also 
mediates between past and present and, therefore, makes it possible to look 
upon the future if not with confidence?without drunken expectation. With this 
one crucial difference, however, that Auden and Wilder know how to acknowl 
edge the presence of the destructive element within them and yet keep it at bay 
and, therefore, do not confuse speaking the truth, as Goodman often did, with 
total self-revelation. In a world which stridently insists on its enlightenment (an 
insistence amounting really to a kind of unacknowledged prayer) because it 
fears its brutality, he insisted on its recognizability and its continuity with the 
past that it had inadvertently broken with. He could, therefore, not avoid hurting 
its vanity?although at times he did it willfully, in order to ensure himself he 
was indeed in touch with the past's strength. 
When writers will again learn to read and, therefore, to learn from their only 
possible teachers, the authors of the past, Goodman will, I think, become the 
teacher he always yearned to be. For he shows how it can be done and he dared 
to do it. 
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